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Abstract
Participatory Budgeting (PB) is conceptually powerful because it ties the normative values of non-elite
participation and deliberation to specific policymaking processes. It is a democratic policymaking
process that enables citizens to allocate public monies. PB has spread globally, coming to the United
States in 2009. Our analysis shows that the types of institutional designs used in the United States are
quite different from the original Brazilian programs. What explains the variation in PB institutional
design between Brazil and the United States? Most PB cases in the US are district-level whereas in
Brazil, PB cases are mainly municipal. We account for this variation by analyzing the electoral system;
configuration of civil society; political moment of adoption; and available resources. We use case study
analysis to account for this variation in institutional design. We then assess how the different rule design
is likely to create a different set of institutional outcomes.
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 Introduction 
 
Participatory budgeting (PB) began in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in 1989, after two 
decades of military dictatorship as part of an effort to simultaneously build a 
democratic culture and deliver public goods to underserviced communities. By 
2013 it had been adopted by over 2,500 local governments across Latin America, 
North America, Asia, Africa, and Europe (Sintomer et al. 2013). The World Bank 
and United Nations singled out PB as a “best practice” in democratic innovation 
and policymaking. In Brazil, several billion US dollars have been allocated through 
this public, participatory process. Recent research demonstrates that in the last 20 
years PB in Brazil has enhanced governance, citizens’ empowerment, and the 
quality of democracy (Avritzer 2002; Baiocchi et al. 2011; McNulty 2012; 
Wampler 2007; Russon Gilman 2016). PB in Brazil is associated with increases in 
civil society organizations, spending for health care, and decreases in infant 
mortality rates (Touchton and Wampler 2014).   
 
PB came to the United States in 2009, when Chicago Alderman Joe Moore put $1 
million of his discretionary funds into this participatory process. PB has grown to 
nearly 50 distinct programs across the United States. The US PB programs are 
within the larger family of PB because of there an emphasis on participation, 
deliberation, direct involvement in decision making, and social justice (Wampler 
2012; Pateman 2012). In this article we provide an overview of the differences and 
similarities of PB in the major Brazilian cities of Porto Alegre and Belo Horizonte 
and the major US cities of New York City and Chicago. We refer to these four cities 
when we refer to the Brazilian and US cases.  
 
Our analysis shows that the institutional designs being used in the United States are 
quite different from the original Brazilian programs. Most importantly, most early 
PB cases in the United States are adopted at the district (sub-municipal) level 
whereas in Brazil, most PB cases are at the municipal level. Although there are 
some US-based PB cases adopted at the city level (Vallejo, Boston, Greensboro1), 
the two most prominent cases of PB are the district-based programs in Chicago and 
New York City. We focus on PB in Chicago and NYC, as they are the longest 
standing and most visible U.S. implementations to date. In the case of New York 
City, it represents the largest amount of dollars being allocated through a 
continuous PB cycle in the United States.  
                                                        
1 See http://www.ci.vallejo.ca.us/cms/One.aspx?pageId=52101; https://www.greensboro-
nc.gov/departments/budget-evaluation/participatory-budgeting/about; 
https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/california-transportation-participatory-budgeting-process; 
http://www.pbbuffalo.org/. The Vallejo project has not been sustainable and the Greensboro 
project began in 2015 with a total allocation of $500,000. The Buffalo project is $150,000   
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At the broadest level this article addresses the following question: What explains 
the variation in PB institutional design between Brazil municipalities and the 
district-based programs in the United States? More narrowly, we ask, why is PB 
adopted at the district level in the US? To answer these questions, we consider a 
number of possible explanations, including electoral system and districting rules; 
configuration of civil society; political moment of adoption; and available resources. 
We draw from case study analysis and secondary materials to account for this 
variation in institutional design and program configuration. 
 
Given the differences in PB basic rules, we then turn to the question: How might 
the institutional design affect the outcomes generated? There are several subset 
questions to address, including: How do these rules alter how people/citizens 
engage the processes? In what ways do different types of rules alter the impacts? In 
other words, how should scholars and practitioners alter expectations for PB-
generated outcomes based on institutional design? In particular, the article 
examines the potential consequences of institutional design and process outcomes 
on (1) participants, (2) deliberation, (3) resources, (4) scale of money, (5) public 
learning, and (6) elections. By answering this question, we hope to provide 
preliminary answers to the “Why PB?” question that is often asked by politicians, 
citizens and civil servants. 
 
This article should be of interest to policymakers and academics based in the US 
and Europe because it directly compares the first generation of reform (in Brazil) 
to the second generation (in the US). Given the vast literature on PB in Brazil, this 
will better enable these readers to understand the key differences in these programs. 
And, perhaps most importantly, the comparison of the potential impact will enable 
us to develop a clearer understanding of what we should expect from these 
programs.    
 
The article unfolds in the following manner: First, the article explores the 
theoretical and normative values that guide PB. Second, the article discusses the 
potential impact of institutional design through exploring variation among PB in 
Brazil municipalities and sub-municipal programs in the US. Third, after outlining 
key institutional differences and similarities, the article analyzes five key 
variations: (1) political moment at adoption, (2) institutional context, (3) available 
resources, (4) civil society, and (5) internal PB rules that regulate how and when 
citizens participate. Fourth, the article uses a process-tracing method to analyze 
how the institutional design affects a range of outcomes. This co-authored article 
draws from the field research and work carried out by a US-specialist and a Brazil-
specialist. It is our hope that our specific case study knowledge can be fused to 
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 contribute to provide insights into how variation in PB rules generates distinct 
outcomes. The article concludes by arguing that these rule differences shape future 
research and implementation questions. Given the likely differences in outcomes 
between Brazil’s most successful cases and the growing number of cases in Brazil, 
we consider how this will shape practitioners’ and citizens’ attitudes. 
 
The Promise of Participatory Democracy 
 
The goal of PB is to provide a context for people to engage more deeply in their 
democracy. Participatory institutions aim to enhance governance, citizens’ 
empowerment, and the quality of democracy (Avritzer 2002; Fung 2006; Pateman 
2012). In addition to the broader effects on democracy, PB has an individual-level 
impact on participants. The institutional rules of PB are designed to improve the 
quality of participants’ discourse, roles, responsibilities, and impact. The direct 
engagement of non-elite citizens is thought to provide a corrective to elite, 
technocratic policy decisions as well as to inculcate democratic values among 
participants. 
 
PB processes contain a deliberative element, through which non-elite citizens are 
brought into discussion, dialogue, and negotiation with one another. The degree to 
which citizens engage in deliberation and dialogue is not consistent across different 
forms of PB and has a direct impact on the process and its outcomes. There are 
numerous opportunities for PB to expand the ability for everyday citizens to form 
preferences, effectively communicate, and improve democratic health. PB is 
conceptually powerful because it ties the normative values of non-elite participation 
and deliberation to specific policymaking and decision-making processes. Political 
theorists have been moving toward more unified and systemic approaches for 
analyzing deliberative democracy in context (for discussion see Mansbridge 2013; 
Smith 2009; Thompson 2008).  
 
Mansbridge (2013) identifies three criteria to govern a systemic approach for 
deliberative democracy. The first is epistemic democracy to “produce preferences, 
opinions, and discussions that are appropriately informed by logic and are the 
outcome of substantive and meaningful consideration of relevant reasons” (11). 
Democratic health enables citizens’ considerations to be discussed, aired, and 
appropriately weighed (see also Habermas 1996). Second, is the ethical function to 
foster mutual respect towards effective communication (Mansbridge 2013, 11). 
Promoting mutual respect is an intrinsic part of the process that helps ensure that a 
deliberative process keeps running. Finally, the democratic function supports an 
inclusive political process with equality (12). It requires the inclusion of all types 
of people, which is critical to have an informed, contested environment. It also 
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 enables individuals in deliberative settings to conduct rational, good faith 
discussions to enhance democratic governance. In this capacity, citizens are agents 
who can make active choices to govern their society (Gutmann and Thompson 
2004). 
 
Although theorists have articulated norms for increased participation in a broad 
variety of political interactions, budgets are sometimes missed as opportunities for 
meaningful deliberative and participatory engagement. Fung and Wright (2001) 
articulate a concept of Empowered Deliberative Democracy (EDD) in which 
Brazilian PB is given as one compelling example among others, including: 
neighborhood governance in Chicago to check urban bureaucratic power over 
public schools and policing; Wisconsin Regional Training Partnership (WRTP/BIG 
STEP), which enables organized labor, firms, and government to assist workers in 
employment transitions; and Panchayat reforms in West Bengal and Kerala in India 
that have created both representative and direct channels to empower local villages 
(Fung and Wright 2001).   
 
According to Fung and Wright (2001): “Conceptually, EDD presses the values of 
participation, deliberation, and empowerment to the apparent limits of prudence 
and feasibility” (7). EDD places PB in dialogue with diverse initiatives meant to 
give citizens an additional voice in decision making. Giving citizens a voice in 
decision making can lead to several types of improved democratic outcomes. 
Contemporary conceptions of participatory democracy include a deliberative 
element that interacts with governance (Fung 2007). Barber discusses participatory 
democracy in terms of the values of reasoned rule, self-government, and political 
equality (Barber 2003).  
 
Participatory democracy offers an institutional design framework to empower 
citizens to have a more substantive role in governance beyond a simply consultative 
or advisory one. There is a diverse body of literature, which suggests that 
participatory programs might enhance state accountability, perceptions of efficacy, 
and efficacy (Avritzer 2002; Baiocchi 2005; Baiocchi et al. 2011; Fung and Wright 
2003; Gaventa and Barrett 2012; Gibson and Woolcock 2008; Labonne and Chase 
2009; McNulty 2012; Wampler 2007). 
  
Touchon and Wampler (2014), studying PB in Brazil, identify three aspects of PB 
programs that can uniquely strengthen democracy. First, governments adopting PB 
incorporate community-based organizations (CSOs) and citizens into the 
governance process. Second, the design of PB programs allocates greater levels of 
resources to underserviced, poor neighborhoods while also increasing spending on 
social services which the benefit the poor. Finally, directly empowering citizens to 
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 make public decisions provides hands-on civic education. The very process of 
engaging in participatory democracy provides a powerful “school of democracy” 
(Baoicchi 2005).  
 
The participatory and deliberative aspects of PB can serve as citizenship training, 
providing a kind of learning whereby citizens leave with more knowledge, 
increased self-efficacy, and fewer antidemocratic attitudes (Almond and Verba 
1963). “Individuals learn to participate by participating” (Pateman 2012, 10). 
Scholars have suggested that when people engage in participatory democracy they 
are better able to assess the performance of elected officials on both local and 
national levels (Santos 2005; Abers 2000). Furthermore, according to Amartya Sen, 
expanding human capabilities offers the greatest promise for producing broad 
social development (for discussions see Touchton and Wampler 2014, 1446). 
Broadening these capabilities, in turn, can enable citizens to have more agency in 
their governance.  
 
However, there are also concerns about the institutional design of PB and a fear 
that the concept has traveled too far and lost its original intent. First, there is a 
concern that participatory democracy has come to be seen as “ideological, oriented 
to personal transformation, and—no coincidence—as white” (Polleta 2005, 271). 
Organizational choice impacts the way people view a given process and the types 
of people who may be compelled to be a part of it. Polleta, used process-tracing to 
analyze the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) of the mid-1960s, 
demonstrates how participatory democracy became viewed as driven by principles 
instead of impact, focused on personal self-liberation rather than political change, 
and dominated by white, rather than black, participants (Poletta 2005, 272). 
 
An additional critique of deliberative democracy, and participatory democracy in 
particular, is the lack of concern or relationships with wider society. According to 
Pateman (2012), “This means, for the most part, that ‘democracy’ in the wider 
society and political system is outside of their purview” (10). Instead of one-off 
deliberative experiments, Pateman calls for the creation of a “participatory society” 
which requires structural changes (10).  Within this context, the institutional rules 
governing PB shape the degree to which the process can empower and enfranchise 
diverse, traditionally marginalized participants and the opportunity for PB to 
become more than a series of small-scale experiments. PB’s ability to affect wider 
societal concerns is inextricably linked to its process configurations.   
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 Institutional Design: PB in Brazil and the United States 
 
We know from Ostrom’s 1990 Nobel prize-winning work that institutional 
configurations greatly affect collective action. Ostrom worked within a rational 
choice institutional framework to provide a better explanation of why there is far 
more cooperation than rational choice theory would predict. The core of Ostrom’s 
insight is that individuals are not only involved in one-time, single-shot interactions, 
but also in long-term interactions. When individuals have a past history and when 
they know that they will continue to work together in the future, there is a very 
different decision-making calculus than the classic rational choice models would 
suggest. Individuals are more likely to work together to find mutually agreeable 
solutions because democratic deliberation is not a zero-sum game but can produce 
positive-sum outcomes. It is vital to include an institutional analysis of PB, not just 
to supplement the broad number of sociological-based work, but because PB is a 
co-governance institution that involves intensive involvement of state officials.  
 
Ostrom’s insights are applicable to participatory democracy because citizens are 
encouraged to deliberate with each other regarding how they will spend scarce 
resources; citizens and government officials negotiating within PB have a past 
history and they are likely to work together again in the future, so there is a strong 
emphasis on cooperation. The deliberative characteristics of PB induce participants 
to listen to one another, present their arguments, and then vote.  
 
Ostrom’s insights are specifically applicable to PB in a couple of ways. First, PB 
encourages deliberation, which involves speaking and listening. As we argue in this 
article, PB in Chicago and NYC much more strongly emphasis small-group 
deliberation than is the case in Brazil. Brazilian PB programs sought to mobilize 
greater numbers of participants, which limited deliberation among participants. 
Second, PB encourages the formation of voting alliances among citizens, many of 
whom may not initially know each other. This encourages cooperation in 
subsequent years (Avritzer 2002; Baiochhi 2005; Wampler 2007). In a case from 
Ipatinga Brazil, Wampler uses the example of a rural community organization that 
agreed to delay its more expensive project until the fourth year of PB; during the 
intervening years, the community members voted for other groups’ projects 
(Wampler 2007: 105). Third, PB encourages an ongoing commitment from its 
participants to hold government to account and keep the process running year-to-
year. Unlike voting every two or four years, PB asks participants for a more 
sustained engagement. As a result, government officials know that they must treat 
participants with more respect because they will likely encounter each other in the 
following year. 
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 We analyze the institutional design of PB in Brazil and the United States using the 
framework of Fung’s (2006) “democracy cube,” which offers an institutional 
approach to better conceptualize deliberation. The democracy cube outlines three 
distinct dimensions: (1) who participates, (2) how participants communicate, and 
(3) the degree to which discussions are linked with policy or public action. Within 
Fung’s schema, the participants in PB are lay stakeholders as opposed to 
professional stakeholders or randomly selected participants. The mode of 
communication is deliberation and the degree of authority is on the higher end of 
the spectrum, with PB’s voting mechanism leading to binding policy results that 
government officials implement in turn. Fung’s Cube is particularly relevant to the 
study of PB because PB programs generally include participation of non-elite actors, 
public deliberation, and the delegation of authority to citizens. 
 
Tables One and Two presents similarities and key differences in PB in large 
Brazilian and United States cities. The first important difference is the political and 
administrative context of PB. In Brazil, these programs are almost exclusively 
adopted at the municipal level, although there was a PB experiment at the state level 
(Goldfrank and Schneider 2006). Brazilian mayors are politically powerful, thus 
allowing them to implement very different policymaking processes. It was this 
concentration of authority in the mayor’s office that created the necessary political 
space to create a new democratic process (Wampler 2007). In the US, city council 
members seeking to expand their connections to citizens initiated PB.  
 
A second major difference that we identify in our comparative analysis is that 
Brazilian programs more strongly emphasize “within-PB representation” while US 
programs more strongly emphasize “within-PB deliberation.” By “within-PB 
representation,” we refer to internal selection processes in which elected or self-
appointed community leaders are extended additional responsibilities not held by 
the average participants. For example, community leaders are called upon to 
publicly debate or to organize planning documents to propose documents.  By 
“within-PB deliberation,” we refer to a process in which all participants are induced 
to deliberate over policy proposals and community needs. For example, participants 
might be randomly assigned to a group where all participants have the opportunity 
to actively deliberate over their needs. 
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 Table 1 
Key Similarities Between Brazilian and United States PB 
 
 Brazilian PB United States PB 
Participant 
Selection: 
Open Call for Participation 
 
Neighborhood-level meetings 
 
Annual Process 
 
Lay Stakeholders and 
Professional Stakeholders  
Open Call for Participation 
 
Neighborhood-level meetings 
 
Annual Process 
 
Lay Stakeholders and Professional 
Stakeholders 
Communication 
Mode: 
Deliberation and Negotiation 
    Neighborhood-level meetings 
led by community activists 
 
Regional meetings—Short 
talks (3 minutes) position-
taking led by CSO leaders 
  
Aggregation and Bargaining  
     CSO leaders lead 
conversations 
 
     Residents exchange 
information, learn new 
information and leadership 
skills 
Deliberation and Negotiation 
     Neighborhood-level meetings that 
include facilitated conversations in 
small groups moderated by 
community members      
      
     Regional—N/A  
 
Aggregation and Bargaining  
Community residents who sign up to 
serve as Budget Delegates lead 
groups/meeting 
 
Residents exchange information, learn 
new information and leadership skills  
 
Authority: Direct authority over allocating 
public monies 
Direct authority over allocating public 
monies 
 Agenda Setting 
Formulation of neighborhood-
level policy proposals 
 
Adoption 
Regional-level vote, followed by 
municipal-level vote, then policy 
implementation  
 
Oversight 
Weakly utilized 
Agenda Setting  
Formulation of neighborhood-level 
policy proposals 
 
Adoption  
District-level vote by residents to select 
top policies; then elected official 
adoption, followed by implementation 
 
Oversight 
Weakly utilized 
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Table 2 
Key Differences Between PB in Large Brazilian and US Cities 
 
 Brazil US 
Location Municipality District (sub-municipal) 
Participants SES: Mainly low-income SES: More economically 
diverse 
Representation Elected budget delegates Volunteers 
 Greater emphasis on 
representation 
Greater emphasis on 
deliberation; facilitated 
deliberation 
 Municipality-wide 
council 
Local steering committee 
Administrative Support Transportation and child 
care often provided 
Limited to no support 
Recruitment Government  CSO partnership 
   
Types of Projects Selected Capital funds and social 
service spending 
Capital funds 
Level of Resources Larger stakes Small stakes 
 Lower infrastructure 
costs so money goes a 
longer way 
Not enough dollars at 
stake to influence social 
policy 
Social Justice Written into rules 
(Quality of Life Index) 
General call 
   
Oversight Weak because generated 
by government 
Oversight led by council 
members’ staff—check 
and balance  
 
In Brazil, the emphasis on representation is notable in three ways. In the large 
regional meetings, where attendance may be between 500 and 1,000 individuals, it 
is only a relatively small number of participants who speak and are actively engaged. 
Most participants listen and are there to show their support. Second, Brazilian PB 
programs elect, from a pool of citizen-participants, “PB Delegates” who are then 
tasked with negotiation, deliberation and oversight. Finally, many PB programs use 
a municipality-wide PB council (Conselho do Orçamento Participativo or COP), 
which is an elected body of 20 to 30 PB delegates who are involved in oversight 
9
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 and making the program work. Thus, the Brazilian cases draws upon principles 
associated with participatory democracy as well as representative democracy. 
 
In contrast, the New York and Chicago PB programs focus on the direct 
engagement of citizens at the local level. The district-level focus was led by city 
council members and the community partners; there were a strong emphasis on 
encouraging deliberation at the local level. There are several opportunities for 
deliberation, which first occur at the hyper-local neighborhood assembly meetings 
where residents identify neighborhood priorities for spending. Neighborhood 
residents learn about their city’s budget process and the PB process, and then break 
up into groups to brainstorm. The organizers compile the results of these 
deliberations for the budget delegate phase of the process. At these neighborhood 
assemblies residents sign up to serve as budget delegates. The budget delegate 
phase follows, which offers opportunities for deliberation and dialogue for a self-
selected smaller group of people than the idea assemblies. The US has a long history 
of using local deliberative processes; from the voluntary membership associations 
Tocqueville lauded to the idealized vision of New England Town Halls (Bryan 
2003). PB fits into a longer history of a strong emphasis on public dialog. Thus, the 
US cases draw more heavily than the Brazilian cases on deliberative and 
participatory principles.  
 
 
Assessing Variation  
 
What accounts for the variation between the municipal-level implementation of PB 
in Brazil and district-level implementations in the United States? We analyze five 
categories that help to explain the variation between the Brazilian and US 
processes: (1) political moment at adoption, (2) institutional context, (3) available 
resources, (4) civil society, and (5) internal PB rules that regulate how and when 
citizens participate. For example, an internal rule is the degree of deliberation and 
representation within a given process. These criteria help inform the potential 
consequences of institutional design and process outcomes.  
 
Political Moment at Adoption 
 
PB developed in Brazil in a political moment marked by re-establishment of 
democracy and, importantly, with the widespread interest in creating new 
democratic institutions. PB was one among many new democratic institutions 
created in Brazil during the 1980s and 1990s (others include policy councils and 
conferences). Brazilian PB’s roots lie in the post-authoritarian left in Brazil, in a 
political situation that grew out of 21 years of a military dictatorship. New thinking 
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 revolved around the concept of “radical democracy,” also known as “direct 
democracy,” “deepening democracy,” and “democratizing democracy” (Goldfrank 
2007). It was influenced by Marxist ideology and initiated by a specific political 
party, the Workers’ Party (Santos 2005; Abers 2000; Avritzer 2002, 2009; Baiocchi 
2001, 2005; Goldfrank 2011; Wampler 2007). 
 
The Workers’ Party was a reformist, outsider political party that had deep ties to 
social movements and community organizations. The Workers’ Party sought to 
accomplish a number of goals through PB: Engender greater participation, reform 
the policymaking process, build a base of political support, and attend to the policy 
and political demands of its base. There was an incipient party system in which 
party leaders were seeking to establish their base of support and establish a party 
“brand.” The Workers’ Party sought to brand themselves as participatory, 
democratic, and social justice oriented (Wampler 2008). 
 
In the original campaign for PB, the Workers’ Party (PT) outlined four basic 
principles for PB: (1) direct citizen participation in government decision-making 
processes and oversight; (2) administrative and fiscal transparency as a deterrent 
for corruption; (3) improvements in urban infrastructure and services, especially in 
aiding the indigent; and (4) change in political culture so that citizens could be 
democratic agents (see Goldfrank 2012; Ganuza and Baiocchi 2012; Peck and 
Theodore 2015). 
 
In contrast, the United States has a more rigid party system that is dominated by 
two political parties. In most urban cities in the (e.g., Chicago, New York, Boston, 
San Francisco, Seattle, Portland), a single party—the Democratic Party—is the 
dominant political actor. In these urban environments, the most important elections 
are often, but not always, the primary elections. Democratic candidates must 
distinguish themselves vis-à-vis their Democratic rivals. Local-level politicians, 
such as aldermen (Chicago) and city council members (New York), work to 
organize and establish their own political bases. The PB process serves as one 
instrument to reach their constituents. Chicago aldermen often have personal 
relationships with their constituents and effectively serve as “mayors” of their 
wards, with significant decision-making power. For example, wards in Chicago are 
much smaller than council districts in New York City. There is roughly 1 aldermen 
for every 57,000 residents. In contrast, New York City has 1 city council members 
for every 165,000 residents.2 
 
 
                                                        
2 Population data for both cities via the United States Census Bureau website, Census.gov, July 
2009. 
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 Institutional Context 
 
PB in Brazil has been adopted at the municipal-level, which allows their PB process 
to access greater resources. By contrast, in the Chicago and NYC, elected officials 
representing single member districts implemented PB. These officials bypassed 
mayors and other political leaders, and instead have used their discretionary funds 
to begin the process. Because Chicago and NYC have single member districts, 
council members have greater flexibility to implement PB within their districts.  In 
Brazil, city council members are elected from the city as a whole and those don’t 
have a specific incentive to support a district-level PB. 
 
The relative strength of Brazilian mayors over local legislators plays a role in the 
structure of PB. Through powerful mayors in Brazil, PB often enters in conflict 
with the city council, whereas in Chicago and New York City, it has been the 
councilors or aldermen themselves who have instituted PB. In recent decades in the 
US, local-level elected officials have been concentrating more power. This is in 
part a reflection of the devolution of services from the federal to subnational 
governments for implementation but it is also reflected in the growing power of 
city council officials (Hall and O’Toole 2004; Milward and Provan 2000).  For 
example, since reforms in 1989, the New York City Council has expanded in terms 
of size and its roles and responsibilities (for earlier history pre-reforms see Sayre 
and Kaufman 1960).  
 
PB first implementation in the United States, at the behest of one Chicago alderman, 
was instituted with neither a strong partisan nor ideological framework. The New 
York City process is bipartisan, in distinct contrast with the partisan framing of PB 
in Brazil. Citywide processes are emerging—as seen in Boston, Massachusetts, or 
Greensboro, North Carolina, but to date these have been limited to small amounts 
of public monies or pilot processes. These cities are Democratic strongholds; in 
one-party dominant districts such as these, the process can be viewed as partisan 
and a key issue becomes, “What kind of Democrat are you?” PB is one example of 
how elected officials within these one-party dominant urban areas may work to 
distinguish themselves. 
 
Civil Society 
 
Brazilian PB is associated with a broader mobilization of civil society. Adopting 
PB in Brazil is associated with an increase in the number CSOs. PB’s rules create 
specific incentives for citizens to participate in ongoing policymaking processes 
and to mobilize themselves into associations. This difference helps, in part, to 
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 explain the type of people who participate and their preferences. Research on PB 
in Brazil has demonstrated that broad majorities of participants and elected PB 
delegates have low income, low levels of education, and are often women (Abers 
2000; Avritzer 2009; Baiocchi 2005; Nylen 2003; Wampler 2007), thus confirming 
that PB rules have successfully expanded public venues to include poor and 
traditionally excluded sectors.  
 
Brazilian PB has been a tool to empower traditionally marginalized community 
members and enact policies that reflect the priorities of the poor. Many PB 
programs now adopt a “quality of life index,” which allocates greater resources on 
a per capita basis to poorer neighborhoods (Wampler 2007). This creates a 
preferential bias in favor of the low-income residents, thereby encouraging them to 
participate. The process is also designed to allocate public dollars to the types of 
policy problems that most strongly affect poor neighborhoods (e.g., access to public 
health care and public housing, building basic infrastructure). In Brazil, there is an 
emphasis on infrastructure projects. 
 
In the Chicago and NYC PB programs, there are not specific social justice rules 
that determine the allocation of public resources to low-income communities. 
However, social justice considerations are part of the broader deliberation about 
how resources are distributed (Lerner and Secondo 2012).3  In both Chicago and 
NYC, considerable time and efforts was spent on incorporating poor and politically 
marginalized groups (Lerner 2014). The active involvement of individuals from 
poor and politically marginalized groups greatly increases the likelihood that policy 
concerns of central importance in these communities will be raised by participants.  
Of course, it doesn’t guarantee that these citizens’ demands will be meant.  One 
task for researchers will be to determine if and how the inclusion of social justice 
values within the debates translates into projects that reflect these interests and if 
there is an accountability mechanism in place.   
 
In Chicago and NYC, a strong emphasis on social inclusion is bringing new civic 
voices into the process, but there is wide variation among PB programs regarding 
who participates. Some communities have been able to encourage more diversity 
than others along various socio-economic indicators such as race, income, and 
education. In practice, New York and Chicago have been successful overall in 
mobilizing a wide cross-section of residents to engage as participants. While 
higher-income residents are still overrepresented in some districts, city officials 
have engaged in pro-active efforts to engage low-income and minority households, 
for example by targeting distinct communities, such as public housing residents, 
                                                        
3 We thank an anonymous review for bringing this point to our attention. 
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 youth, and seniors. Roughly a third of assemblies included multilingual 
interpretation and translation support (CDP and PBNYC, 2015). 
 
In New York City, 51,000 residents voted in the 2014-15 PB cycle. The majority 
of these voters, 57 percent, identified as people of color, in comparison to 47 
percent for local election voters (CDP and PBNYC, 2015).  Initial data from PB in 
the United States, including in New York City, demonstrates that PB is an effective 
gateway for getting people to vote.  Comparing data from two districts in New York 
City, District 39 and District 23, researchers compared a PB voter with another 
similar person in the voter file who could not participate in PB because their district 
was not participating.  The researchers’ matched people from neighborhoods with 
similar racial composition, income, education, and voting patterns. Through this 
process, researches demonstrates that people who vote in PB on average are 7% 
more likely to vote in subsequent other elections (Lerner, 2018). 
  
Research on PB in the US demonstrates the black residents and white residents are 
generally overrepresented or represented proportionally to their community’s 
general share of the local census track (Hagelskamp et al 2016). But Hispanic 
residents are often systematically underrepresented. With regard to education and 
income, there is a bit of bifurcation. Lower-income households were 
overrepresented or represented proportionally in most PB programs, but there was 
also overrepresented among those with the highest education levels (graduate and 
undergraduate degrees) (Hagelskamp et al2016). This bifurcation indicates the PB 
programs are partially successful in attracting new political actors into the political 
system, most notably among young, low-income residents.  The programs still 
difficulties attracting Hispanics and those with lower education levels.  
 
Finally, we lack information to know if the inclusion of these new voices is being 
translated into new community organizations or the strengthening of existing 
organizations. Citizens may organize themselves as they seek to have a greater 
voice in the process, but it is unknown at this time if new civic voices are being 
translated into new community organizations. 
  
Available Resources 
 
There is a greater concentration of resources in the hands of mayors in Brazil. 
Mayors prepare the budget and, after it is approved by the city council, they often 
have the right to reallocate up to 20 percent of the budget without additional 
approval. Although city councils have the right to reject a mayor’s proposed budget, 
the outcome of a rejected budget is that the previous year’s budget is adopted. This 
means that the mayor has considerable leeway to move resources from department 
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 to department and from project to project. At the height of Porto Alegre’s PB 
experience, in the late 1990s and early 2000s, upwards of 15 percent of the entire 
municipal budget was being allocated through PB.  This often represented 100 
percent of new capital spending. However, this high mark soon dissipated in Porto 
Alegre and in other large Brazilian cities. It became much more common to allocate 
1 to 3 percent of the entire municipal budget to PB. Nevertheless, this percentage 
is much larger than in the US PB programs. 
 
In Chicago and NYC, resources come from legislators who have a decentralized set 
of discretionary funds to spend in their individual districts. As a result, the process 
in the NYC and Chicago is restricted to a set percentage of councilors’ discretionary 
funds, whereas PB in Brazil often has no clearly defined amount of resources at its 
disposal. Currently a small level of discretionary funds are being allocated to the 
process in the Chicago and NYC, potentially constraining PB projects to smaller-
stake political issues with redistributive social impact. To date, Chicago and NYC’s 
PB programs started with a pre-determined amount of funds and has not used a 
needs-based tool, such as Brazil’s quality of life index. Without a bounded set of 
dollars, US PB may use different structures to determine need, which may have 
longer-term policy implications.  
 
Since 1994, aldermen in Chicago have been receiving “menu money” in the amount 
of roughly $1.3 million per ward per annum for infrastructure projects  (Russon 
Gilman 2016). This “menu money” is disbursed equally to all fifty wards in 
Chicago in a need-blind allocation. The PB process in New York City was able to 
leverage roughly $1 million per council member in discretionary funds. Starting in 
2009 with a bipartisan group of four City Council members in 2009, the process in 
2016 involved 28 (of the 51) council members and has a centralized support 
structure in the Speaker of the City Council’s office.  
 
Internal Rules 
 
In the United States process, deliberation occurs early and often, and the emphasis 
is on within-PB deliberation rather than within-PB representation (for discussions 
see Russon Gilman 2016). Budget delegates volunteer to serve, contrasted with the 
Brazilian system of electing representatives to serve on administrative committees 
or the PB council). The United States process involves a greater degree of 
deliberation in the brainstorming phase than its Brazilian counterpart. In the New 
York City and Chicago programs, the focus is on educating citizens, providing 
learning opportunities, and facilitating small-group discussions. Informed by these 
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 practices, speech and deliberation have been a vital component of PB’s starting 
formula in the United States.4 
 
The current PB process in Chicago and NYC is based on four phases. The first 
phase of the process, idea assemblies, offer both an educational and deliberative 
component. Neighborhood residents learn about their city’s budget process and the 
PB process, then break up into groups to brainstorm. The organizers compile the 
results of these deliberations for the budget delegate phase of the process. Attendees 
at these neighborhood assemblies vary, with roughly forty people per community 
across the country during 2014-2015. At these events, people sign up to serve as 
budget delegates.  
 
The budget delegate phase follows, which offers opportunities for deliberation and 
dialogue for a smaller group of people than the idea assemblies. Residents learn 
about city guidelines, hear from government experts, and work to reach consensus 
about which projects should appear on the ballot. The only requirement for budget 
delegates is that they are residents within the community they represent. The budget 
delegate phase often starts with an orientation to identify common themes among 
the ideas submitted; residents then break up into thematic committees, e.g., Parks 
and Recreation, Streets and Sidewalks, Public Housing, etc.   
 
A facilitator leads these specific thematic subcommittees. Facilitators receive 
varying degrees of training across districts and have unique backgrounds. Some 
facilitators have previous experience moderating or are community leaders while 
others are relatively new to facilitation. The budget delegate phase is time-intensive, 
often requiring a significant time commitment to attend in-person meetings over 
several weeks or months. There is often attrition during this phase. What stands out 
is that ordinary citizen participants have multiple opportunities to deliberate over 
project selection and implementation.  
 
By contrast, Brazilian PB often has a structured representative system—as seen in 
the municipal-wide PB council (COP)—as well as in the large-group assemblies. 
Deliberation takes places in Brazil, but it is spearheaded, especially in the case of 
the large assemblies, by a small number of CSO leaders. Citizen-participants often 
politely listen and may learn from the deliberation, but most people in the large 
meetings never speak. In the COP, there is also extensive deliberation but among a 
limited number of representatives (30 to 50 in large cities). Deliberation in Brazil 
                                                        
4 See Weeks (2000) for large-scale deliberative processes in the early 1990s that engaged citizens 
to address municipal budget concerns in Eugene, Oregon, and Sacramento, California. For other 
examples of US-based citizen engagement on budgeting, see Center for Priority Based Budgeting 
2015 (www.pbbcenter.org/). 
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 is more likely to occur at the neighborhood level, when citizens and CSO leaders 
prepare for the regional meetings. There are often lively discussions regarding 
priorities and needs. Many of these meetings take place outside of the formal PB 
process. The ideas from the citizens are thus funneled into the main venues.   
 
In sum, the PB program in Chicago and New York City programs provide greater 
opportunities for citizens to engage in public deliberation whereas the municipal-
wide cases in PB more strongly emphasized the role of leaders to carry out key 
functions such as public speaking and working on oversight committees. 
 
Institutional Design Consequences  
 
As demonstrated above, Brazilian and US PB programs differ in their institutional 
design in a number of ways: (1) participants, (2) deliberation, (3) resources, (4) 
scale of money, (5) public learning, and (6) elections. A key issue for this study is 
the extent to which PB generates different outcomes.  
 
Who Participates? 
 
The participants in the Chicago and NYC PB processes represent a wider cross-
section of people than in Brazil. While higher-income residents are overrepresented 
in some US cases (e.g., Park Slope or the Upper West Side in NYC), there has been 
a dedicated strategy to engage low-income households. For example, the largest US 
PB process to date has been in New York City, where the process has made a 
deliberative strategy to target distinct communities, such as public housing 
residents, youth, and senior to participate (Russon Gilman 2016).  At the idea 
collection phase, neighborhood assemblies, roughly a third of assemblies had 
language support including interpretation and translation (CDP and PBNYC, 2015).  
 
NYC’s PB has been effective at ensuring that PB voters represent a larger 
percentage of previously marginalized residents than in traditional elections. In the 
period from 2014 to 2015, 51,000 residents voted.  The majority of NYCPB voters, 
57 percent identified as people of color, in comparison to 47 percent of local 
election voters and 66% of the total population of the participating twenty-four 
districts (CDP and PBNYC, 2015). As one black public housing resident told an 
author, “I thought all the affluent white people would look down upon me because 
I live in public housing—in reality, they were all understanding and wanted to help.” 
This comment illustrates how PB programs can generate new connections and 
forms of understanding among disparate communities. The emphasis on social 
inclusion helps bring individuals from politically marginalized groups directly into 
formal policymaking spaces.  
17
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The New York City process is successful at galvanizing typically marginalized 
communities, in part, because of strong community anchors with rich ties to 
community members. The lead technical non-profit organizing PB in North 
America, the Participatory Budgeting Project (PBP) is located in Brooklyn and 
Community Voices Heard (CVH) is the grassroots organizing partner for the city’s 
process. CVH is a membership multiracial organization that organizes low- income 
populations to influence policy change. PBP and CVH have been advocated for 
PBP adoption and leveraging their networks to participate. A large organizing effort 
helped bring PB to New York City, as Baez and Hernandez (2012, 324) note: “The 
CMs [Council members] had never heard of PB before being approached by 
community- based organizations.”  
 
In places in the United States where CSOs play a stronger role, there is more diverse 
representation in the PB vote (Russon Gilman 2016). In communities that 
conducted CSO outreach, there was an association with increased representation of 
traditionally marginalized communities at the vote. However, the role of civil 
society is unevenly dispersed throughout the process. Some communities have a 
strong support network of civil society that, in turn, can lift and amplify PB. Other 
communities have less well-established civic infrastructure.  To date, the evidence 
suggests that PB programs in Chicago and NYC are able to incorporate individuals 
from poor and politically marginalized communities. However, we do not yet have 
evidence that their programs have stimulated the creation of new civil society 
organizations. Rather, in some communities has benefited from already well-
established civic institutions.     
 
In Brazil, early recruit efforts typically focused on poor neighborhoods with 
minimal attention to middle class communities. Those who participate are more 
likely to be women, over 40 years old, and with less than a high school education 
(Wampler 2007; Goldfrank 2011). In addition, evidence suggests that many come 
from large communities (favelas or low-income communities) (Abers 2000; 
Baiocchi 2005). The groups that are less likely to participate include those in very 
precarious economic situations (homeless, extreme poverty) as well as those who 
live in small communities (since they cannot generate enough votes to secure their 
policy preferences). In addition, middle- and upper-middle-class residents do not 
often participate because they know that they will be vastly outnumbered by poor 
residents from large favelas as well as because most middle-class residents do not 
depend on the types of social services provided by the municipal government. It is 
important to note that third generation PB reforms in Belo Horizonte and Porto 
Alegre sought to incorporate middle class and youth sectors into PB processes. 
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 Deliberation in US vs. Representation in Brazil 
 
The Brazilian PB programs include basic elements of deliberation and 
representation in their processes, whereas the US programs have a greater focus on 
deliberation. There are three key reasons for these differences. First, the US 
program was led by the Participatory Budgeting Project (PBP), a CSO that 
advocated for increased participation and better deliberative processes (Lerner 
2014). As a CSO bringing PB to elected officials and galvanizing support, it has 
been focused on community engagement and empowering diverse stakeholders to 
have a say in the process. In the original PB process in Chicago, there was a set 
number of elected community representatives in the guidelines; the guidelines were 
later revised to enhance community participation. In Brazil, a political party was 
the principal proponent of PB; they promoted greater participation and less 
deliberation. 
 
The second reason, intertwined with the first, is that the Brazilian CSOs sought to 
increase the number of participants to demonstrate the worthiness of their claims to 
a broader audience. This interest in broad participation was shared by the Workers’ 
Party, since in the new democratic environment, political parties had to worry about 
turning out the vote.  
 
Third, in the US, there is a longer, more well-established political tradition of 
deliberation. From New England town halls to public hearings, public deliberation 
was within the larger “political repertoire” of democratic politics in the US (Tarrow 
1992; Bryan 2003). In the context of the US, there was a greater emphasis on the 
quality of the dialogue and debate, leveraging the North American tradition of 
participatory planning, community engagement, and small grants. This contrasts 
sharply with Brazil’s new democracy, in which they had to experiment with new 
forms of deliberation and representation, and find a way to use different democratic 
tools. 
 
There are several unexamined research questions about the quality and 
effectiveness of these deliberations. Currently, there is wide variation in the quality 
and training of moderators. There is also wide variation in the amount of resources 
expended by public administrators. Public bureaucrats are often volunteering on 
their off hours to help provide resources to budget delegate committees, which 
greatly influences the process of dialogue and deliberation. When and how can 
deliberations help participants? What is the quality of information delivered to 
participants and how does that impact the nature of deliberations? Better-informed 
deliberation may increase the quality of democratic debates and improve signaling 
back to elected officials about citizens’ preferences.  
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A more diffuse, broad-based engagement from civil society could also potentially 
engage traditionally marginalized participants. Currently, the US PB process has 
had neither the resources nor people power to bring new civil society organizations 
into the formal governance process. PB has been able to tap into and leverage 
existing strong civil infrastructure. While the US process has aimed to engage 
several traditionally marginalized populations including youth and non-citizens, 
there further resources are needed to enhance the public learning impacts.  
 
Resources, Scale of Money, and Type of Projects 
 
We would expect Brazilian PB programs to have a larger impact on policy and 
social well-being outcomes because of the greater amounts of resources dedicated 
to these programs. In Brazil, the start of PB program in the 1990s coincided with 
an expansion of public monies spent by municipal governments. Mayors interested 
in PB thus had greater flexibility and more resources than their predecessors. PB 
administrators in Brazil had far greater resources than their US counterparts. In the 
larger Brazilian cities of Porto Alegre, Belo Horizonte, and São Paulo, it was 
common for citizens to propose medium-sized infrastructure projects, such as 
building health clinics or schools. Larger projects, such as housing projects, were 
less likely to be included because of the costs associated with implementing them. 
The policy selection of PB participants reflects the demand for basic infrastructure 
projects. 
 
With an average of $1 million dollars of capital funds in each PB district in Chicago 
and NYC, what can be achieved? The small-scale investment limits the PB 
process’s ability to have a large social policy or redistributive affect. Based on the 
current PB funding, further research is needed to see when and how PB addresses 
areas of greatest need—and not simply the preferences of those residents who self-
select to serve as budget delegates. It is currently unclear if PB in Chicago or NYC 
is having any type of redistributive impact or reaching communities with the 
greatest need.  
 
PB in Chicago and NYC often revolves around community organizing and allowing 
local politicians to connect with new constituencies. It is not about building broad-
based power or radically disrupting the status quo budget system in a visible way. 
The decentralized process, with limited funding, results in less tangible big budget 
allocation for the public at large. Smaller allocations result in less publicity drawn 
to specific projects which may lead to a feedback loop where constituents are less 
aware of PB projects and therefore do not place a lot of political pressure on elected 
officials to expand the resources dedicated to PB.  
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The amount of funding at stake also influences the salience of representation in PB. 
Currently, each US implementing locality places a very small portion of overall 
funds into PB. While across the United States nearly $50 million was allocated, this 
is distributed in amounts averaging $1 million per PB process, typically of capital 
funds. Within each district, there are price restrictions to ensure projects do not cost 
more than $500,000; given the costliness of implementing government services, 
this curtails the scale at which PB influences public policy. Across 45 PB projects 
in North America5 during 2014-15, the average winning project cost $195,506 
(Hagelskamp et al. 2016). Across the United States, an average of five projects were 
funded.  
 
In the 2014-15 United States PB process, parks and recreation projects were the 
most common ballot items overall, followed by school projects (Hagelskamp et al. 
2016). Overall, schools received the largest share of PB-allocated funds (33 
percent). The least common types of projects on the ballot were public housing and 
public safety projects. Public housing projects rarely appear on ballots and also 
have a low chance of winning funding when they do appear because of their high 
cost.    
 
Elections 
 
We would expect PB to have an important impact on the election of city council 
members in cities like Chicago and NYC, but very little impact in Brazil. For 
mayors, we expect the opposite. In Chicago and NYC, the effect may be most 
important in the Democratic primaries for city races. But here, too, we observe that 
the political value of PB for US mayors is low. While New York Mayor de Blasio 
and Chicago Mayor Emanuel both ran on a platform of support for PB expansion, 
to date, neither mayor has made PB a priority issue or devoted significant time or 
resources to the process. In 2018, Mayor de Blasio indicated that his administration 
would support the expansion of PB into public high schools, allocating $2,000 for 
every public high school, over 400, to decide through the PB process.6 
 
                                                        
5 Hagelskamp et al(2016) Public Agenda data includes 46 community processes in North America. 
Of those, 41 are in the US and five are in Canada. Throughout this article, we have noted when 
data pertains to only the United States or to North America.  
6 “De Blasio In 5th ‘State Of The City’ Address: NYC Must Become ‘Fairest Big City In 
America’” February 13, 2018. CBS New York. http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2018/02/13/bill-de-
blasio-state-of-the-city/ 
21
Gilman and Wampler: The Difference in Design
 After learning about the power of PB in Brazil, in part thanks to outreach from the 
non-profit Participatory Budgeting Process (PBP)7 and other CSOs such as Cities 
for Progress, Chicago’s Alderman Moore decided in 2009 to cede a portion of his 
discretionary funds for infrastructure to the PB process (Russon Gilman 2016; 
Lerner 2014; Baez and Hernandez 2012, 320). Having won the Democratic primary 
by a narrow margin in 2007, Alderman Moore wanted to try something new to 
galvanize supporters. After losing touch with his constituents, Moore enlisted PBP 
to engage his constituents to direct $1.3 million in public funds (see Lerner 2014). 
Since implementing the process, he has been able to elevate his national profile and 
garner support, and voters have kept him in office. In 2011, Moore won with 72 
percent of the vote. “According to Moore, PB was the most common reason people 
gave for re-electing him” (Lerner 2014). The alderman has spoken about PB across 
the country and has even been honored by the White House.8 
 
Following re-election after the initial New York City PB pilot, several of the four 
council members who first implemented PB have taken on new roles and leadership 
responsibilities within the New York City Council structure. One of the first four, 
Melissa Mark-Viverito, was elected to serve as the powerful position of Speaker of 
the City Council. Other early adopters have in since taken on leadership roles within 
the council’s progressive caucus. The speaker and the City Council helped usher in 
a series of good governance reforms to the council’s discretionary spending 
regime. 9  The reforms offer a formulaic, needs-based model of disbursement. 
Through PB, several City Council members have been able to elevate their profile 
and champion a series of governance reforms to increase transparency and 
accountability. 
 
The process in the US depends heavily individual elected officials’ desire and 
staffing capacity. In places where there is limited staffing capacity, such as 
Cambridge, MA, it is more difficult for participants to engage in the process 
because there is insufficient administrative support. Although there is no political 
or ideological mandate, the majority of the proponents are Democrats, who already 
dominate US cities. In Chicago, it took several years for the process to gain traction 
                                                        
7 PBP is a non-profit: “Our mission is to empower people to decide together how to spend public 
money. We create and support participatory budgeting processes that deepen democracy, build 
stronger communities, and make public budgets more equitable and effective.” Participatory 
Budget Project, “Mission & Approach” September 2015 (www.participatorybudgeting.org/who-
we-are/mission-approach/). 
8 See Tal Kopan, “Bad Timing for White House Honor” July 23, 2013. Politico Available at: 
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/07/joe-moore-alderman-white-house-honor-094605 
9 Council of the City of New York, Office of Communications, “Council to Vote on Landmark 
Rules Reform Package,” press release, May 14, 2014 
(http://council.nyc.gov/html/pr/051414stated.shtml). 
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 and for additional aldermen to support it. Even now, there are political concerns to 
maintain Aldermanic menu money discretionary dollars, which would severely 
limit PB in its current manifestation.10 As mentioned above, aldermen effectively 
serve as “mayors” of their wards, so there is little top-down party pressure to 
implement PB. In fact, one Chicago ward decided after a year’s trial that the process 
was too time-intensive and that the turnout was too low to justify continuation 
(Bishku-Aykul 2014). Although enthusiasm for the process was cited, the ward 
decided to implement a type of “PB lite” titled an “infrastructure improvement 
program” (Greenfield 2014). 
 
Although PB in Brazil was a citizen-based participatory process, it was also 
embedded in a new representative democracy. Candidates running for office sought 
to build a base of support by differentiating themselves from other candidates and 
parties. In the most successful cases of PB, such as Belo Horizonte, Porto Alegre, 
Recife, Ipatinga, and Garulhus, the presence of PB was the central plank of a 
governing party that was re-elected multiple times. Although it would be 
nonsensical to credit PB as the primary reason behind these governments’ 
successful re-election, the heavy emphasis on PB was one reason that they won re-
election (Wampler 2007).   
 
Conclusion 
 
Under the broad brand of “Participatory Budgeting,” Brazilian municipalities and 
US city governments are working to directly incorporate citizens into policymaking. 
In both countries, and across multiple programs, governments designed and are 
using participatory policymaking to give citizens a voice and a vote, as well as 
oversight opportunities. This article demonstrates that the adoption of PB in the US 
has several distinct differences from the original Brazilian cases, most notably the 
district-level adoption in US cities like Chicago and NYC and the municipal-level 
adoption in Brazil.  
 
The institutional differences produced PB-processes in Brazil rely heavily on 
“within-PB representation” whereas the US-based processes promote greater 
                                                        
10 In 2017, Chicago’s Inspector General Joe Ferguson released a report recommending that the 
Department of Transportation take over Adlermanic Menu Money, Mayor Emanuel indicated he 
would continue to support the discretionary dollars, as he said; “I don’t think those ideas should be 
generated out of downtown. I think they actually should come from the residents that make up our 
many, many different neighborhood” For coverage see: Alexandra Silets, “The Pitfalls of 
Participatory Budgeting” April 24, 2017. wtttw: Chicago Tonight 
https://chicagotonight.wttw.com/2017/04/24/pitfalls-participatory-budgeting and the Inspector 
General’s note: https://www.scribd.com/document/345778631/CDOT-Aldermanic-Menu-
Program-Audit#from_embed 
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 “within-PB deliberation.” The Brazilian cases drew more heavily from 
representative democracies, which allowed these programs to incorporate greater 
numbers of citizens. The US cases more strongly emphasize deliberation, which 
creates greater opportunities to engage in community building, but there is a greater 
difficulty in incorporating larger numbers of participants.  This emphasis permits 
greater public learning and more opportunities to generate consensus around policy 
selection. However, this focus makes it harder to scale up these programs, 
highlighting a key tension faced by PB advocates in the US: A clear strength of 
their programs is the greater degree of deliberation, but this limits the number of 
people who will be involved and puts constraints on public bureaucrats to lend their 
time and expertise for small group dialogue and deliberation.  A spillover effect of 
the small number of participants is that it is less likely that mayors, congressional 
officials, etc., will pledge extensive support to the US programs. The current 
programs link citizens to city council members; these council members seek to 
generate new opportunities to participate at the neighborhood level. 
 
In addition, the institutional differences in program design (city-wide vs. district) 
means that the Brazilian cases had greater access to resources and more mayoral 
involvement, which created the possibility of a greater impact on well-being 
(Marquetti 2003; Touchton and Wampler 2014). PB in Brazil was created as part 
of a political project that sought to transform the lives of citizens and cities, whereas 
the US-based experiences have been much more focused on expanding citizens’ 
voice in policymaking. The shifts in the US cities like Chicago and NYC may be 
more around attitudinal and behavioral shifts.  
 
Finally, the Brazilian PB cases were created at a moment of democratic renewal, 
which created to explicitly creating “social justice” rules that ensured that poorer 
communities would receive greater resources than wealthier communities. This rule 
helps to account for the higher mobilization among poor citizens as well as the most 
positive impacts on well-being.  In contrast, in the US, the emphasis on social 
inclusion and social justice are organizing principles but they are directly made into 
rules. PB administrators seek to recruit a broader range of participation and there 
are social justice issues discussed during deliberation. There is preliminary 
evidence that some PB programs are successfully incorporating a broader range of 
citizens into the process but we don’t yet have enough evidence to more strongly 
demonstrate how and if these programs are producing social justice-related change.   
 
In sum, PB programs in the US are likely to have different types of impacts than 
have been associated in the Brazilian cases due to differences in institutional design, 
local context and available resources. Given the stronger emphasis on deliberation 
as well as informal efforts to promote social inclusion and social justice, we 
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 encourage researchers and government officials interested in assessing impact to 
draw more heavily from academic and policy works on deliberation. As PB 
continues to expand across the US, we should expect that the outcomes generated 
will differ from the Brazilian cases, which means that researchers should cast a 
wide net to assess how and if social and political change is being generated.   
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